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Abstract: 
 
 The paper aims to understand buyer-supplier power and dependence scenarios 
following a risk sharing contract. The study develops a supply chain risk sharing contract to 
mitigate demand uncertainty and price volatility related risks in a globalised business 
environment. An integer programming model is developed and analysed following an 
automotive case study to generate insights into buyer-supplier relationships. Multiple buyer-
supplier power and dependence scenarios are considered to reflect the possible leverages 
involved in the decision-making. The situational strength evaluated through buyer-supplier 
power and dependence illuminates the inherent complexity in contract negotiation. Thus there 
is an evident need to develop risk sharing contracts for mitigating global risks. The developed 
relationship framework and risk sharing contract model are expected to help SC managers in 
better understanding behavioural aspects during contract negotiations. The risk sharing 
contract model proposed here also contributes to a potentially novel perspective on existing 
theory in buyer-supplier power and dependence by providing a relational perspective on the 
dynamics of supply chain design and collaboration. 
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1. Introduction 
 The rise of global markets and therefore global competition has forced today’s supply 
chains to change their risk management strategies. Risk mitigation is becoming a primary 
motive behind all contractual agreements and is believed to be beneficial for the complete 
supply chain network (Xiao and Yang, 2009). Flexibility in accommodating demand 
fluctuation and responsiveness to price volatility are two key requirements of current supply 
chain management practices. In order to manage uncertainties in demand and pricing, supply 
chains need to develop robust contractual mechanisms especially for highly configured 
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products in automotive, aerospace, electronics and other heavy industries. Typically, Build-
To-Order (BTO) or Make-To-Order (MTO) products are characterised by uncertain demand, 
long lead times and fluctuating purchase costs (Wang and Tsao, 2006). BTO or MTO 
approaches have been actively pursued by companies like Dell Computers, BMW, IBM, HP, 
and Compaq to manage varying patterns of demand (Ghiassi and Spera, 2003; Hsu and Wang, 
2004; Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005). Demand uncertainty incurs a risk cost to the supplier 
whereas price volatility incurs a risk cost to the buyer. Global markets with global competition 
magnify the risks of demand fluctuation and price volatility; such uncertainty means supply 
chains demand additional risk mitigation assurances through the use of different control 
mechanisms such as contracts or legal agreements (Laeequddin et al., 2009). 
 Contractual negotiations with supply chain partners are vital to establish visibility and 
risk control through agreed contractual processes to manage fluctuations in demand and price 
volatility (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2005). Supply chain contractual processes that address 
demand uncertainty like buyback, quantity flexibility, revenue sharing, profit sharing and full 
return have been discussed in the literature (e.g. Cachon and Lariviere, 2005; Emmons and 
Gilbert, 1998; Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999; Jeong, 2012). However, the area of supply chain 
contracts under price uncertainty (e.g. Li and Kouvelis, 1999) has attracted less academic 
attention. The Supply Chain (SC) contractual processes listed earlier all address improving the 
efficiency of a SC network, but do not usually actively address the risk mitigation. Supply 
chain contracts could offer robust strategies to increase SC resilience through mitigating 
uncertainties or risks in addition to making a SC more efficient (Tang, 2006).  
Researchers often utilise the classic newsvendor problem when modelling supply chain 
contracts (e.g. Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Lau et al., 2008; Cheng, 2011), but in this study 
the researchers’ take a pragmatic approach, testing the SC risk sharing contract model in an 
industry setting. Supply chain contracts developed through the newsvendor problem are most 
commonly based on a risk neutrality assumption (Wang and Webster, 2009). However, in a 
stochastic market environment risks such as lost sales, delivery unreliability and obsolesce 
significantly affect all SC stakeholders. Relationship and situational strength (power) are key 
issues within any SC as stakeholders use power and dominance to define the rules of the 
collaborative partnership (Kehoe et al., 2007). Opportunistic behaviour, while making 
decisions, has a severe effect on SC and is receiving increasing attention in supply chain design 
(Craighead et al., 2007; Ellis et al., 2010; Sodhi et al., 2012). In the next section the literature 
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is utilized to identify satisfaction level and dominance level as two parameters used to capture 
negotiating SC dynamics under conditions of buyer-supplier power and dependence.  
 
 In summary, through a risk sharing contract, this study attempts to illuminate the 
behavioural aspects of supplier and buyer that stem from the inevitability of issues of power 
and dependence in supply chain contract negotiations. Studies on flexibility contracts focusing 
on buyer’s ordering behaviour, when faced with a static market demand are evident (e.g. 
Bassok and Anupindi, 2008; Lian and Deshmukh, 2009). Nonetheless, there exists a research 
gap in studying risk sharing contracts under dynamic market requirements that include a buyer-
supplier relational perspective. Furthermore, there is limited literature on supply chain 
contracts under the combined effects of demand uncertainly and price volatility. 
 Following this introduction, section 2 reviews extant literature in two parts, firstly 
introducing work on supply chain risk and uncertainty, then narrowing down to assemble the 
arguments made in the literature for risk sharing contracts. A second section of literature review 
captures the views on power and dependence issues inherent in buyer-supplier relationships. 
Section 3 introduces a conceptual framework to define the objective and to limit the scope of 
the research to the area of buyer-supplier independence. Section 4 presents a risk sharing 
contract model, developed by formulating a mathematical problem in order to obtain the 
optimum contract quantity for mitigating the combined risk of demand fluctuation and price 
volatility in a SC. Section 5 analyses the risk sharing contract model, the results are compared 
with two different solution approaches to studying the situational strength of SC stakeholders. 
Finally, in section 6, conclusions, the importance of a risk sharing contract as a tool to mitigate 
supply chain disruption risk and the need for further research in this area is reiterated and 
additional managerial implications offered for those responsible for managing risks in a 
globalised economy.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Supply chain risk and uncertainty 
 Due to increasing globalisation, practitioners and researchers are paying more attention 
to Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Ghadge et al., 2012). 
This heightened level of attention is evident from several literature reviews on supply chain 
risks and uncertainty (e.g. Natarajarathinam et al., 2009; Rao and Goldsby, 2009; Tang and 
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Musa, 2010; Simangunsong et al., 2012; Sawik, 2016). It is a broad topic that encompasses 
various forms of supply chain risk, including financial and operational risks (Snyder et al., 
2016). SCRM has become a modern challenge because of shorter product life cycles, increased 
uncertainties, etc. (Christopher and Lee, 2004). Furthermore, globalisation increases supply 
chain complexity and increases the impact of disruptions (Christopher and Towill, 2002) and 
general vulnerability to risks (e.g. globalisation related activities such as on-shoring, off-
shoring, complex outsourcing, and increased mergers) (Bakshi and Kleindorfer, 2009). Yu and 
Goh (2014) investigate the twin effects of SC visibility and risk on SC performance. Tang 
(2006) highlights the necessity of new approaches to mitigate vulnerable risks and minimise 
potential losses. 
 Risk and uncertainty are two different terms that are often used interchangeably in the 
academic literature. However, risk can be measured unlike uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Several 
academic definitions of risk and uncertainty co-exist. Most theorists have defined risk as a 
negative outcome. Lowrance (1980) notes that, the term risk means the probability and impact 
of uncertain factors. Rowe (1980) defines risk as the probability of realizing negative 
consequences from uncertainties. Risk has been defined as a measure of the probability and 
severity of adverse effects (Claypool et al., 2014). From a supply chain perspective, risk is 
associated with the negative consequences of uncertainty within the SC or network 
(Christopher and Lee, 2004; Wagner and Bode, 2006). Supply chain risk has been defined as 
purely negative consequence within information, financial and material flows (Wagner and 
Bode, 2008). Supply chain risk sources are unpredictable variables within an organization, 
network or environment. These risks exist because of uncertainty about future risk events, 
which can appear at any point in time in the supply chain (Aqlan and Lam, 2016). 
 Risk mitigation and control strategies are classified into two approaches: proactive and 
reactive (Ghadge et al., 2013). Adopting an effective risk management strategy based on global 
supply chain environment is becoming increasingly challenging (Christopher and Towill, 
2001; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Fahimnia et al. (2015) presents a systematic review of the 
quantitative and analytical models for managing SC risks. SC strategies like dual/multiple 
sourcing, postponement, Vendor-Managed Inventory, long-term contracts, supplier 
collaboration and development are being used not only to improve overall SC performance, 
but also as risk mitigation strategies as evidenced through the literature. Chen et al. (2013) 
presented a collaborative approach for the mitigation of SC operational risks by focusing on 
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supply and demand risks. In a complex SC network there is an imperative to examine the 
flexibility and uncertainty to mitigate risks. Flexibility provides virtual capacity and is one of 
the most effective measures to mitigate supply chain risks (Aqlan et al., 2016). The benefits of 
flexibility to the buyer increase as uncertainty increases (Karakaya and Bakal, 2013). SC risk 
mitigation strategies should be amalgamated with the top managerial decision making 
processes to alleviate supply chain risks and improve the robustness of supply chains (Rajesh 
and Ravi, 2015). Borodin et al. (2016) provides an overview of the latest advances in the 
application of OR methodologies to handling uncertainty occurring in Supply chains.  
2.1.1. Risk sharing contracts 
 A SC contract is a coordination mechanism to integrate SC partners and therefore 
benefit from improved operational performance. Supply chain contracts have been studied 
extensively in the context of traditional supply chains (Knoblich et al., 2015). Research 
suggests that SC contract analysis can improve both operational efficiency and SC coordination 
(Tang, 2006). Demand and pricing uncertainties are associated with many causes; For example, 
exchange rate movements, uncertainty of supply and demand, political turmoil, environmental 
influences and the changing risk preferences of consumers (Fotopoulos et al., 2008). Given 
such lack of visibility over future SC disruptions, risk-sharing contracts are one of the means 
of risk mitigation (Wakolbinger and Cruz, 2011). Uncertainties in demand and pricing, in 
particular, result in a situation where both buyer and supplier face the risk of shortages, delays 
and financial losses. Fang and Shou (2015) examine how levels of competitive intensity and 
supply uncertainty, affect the equilibrium decisions of order quantity and contract sharing. Risk 
sharing partnerships can lead to substantial benefits for the SC network (Buzacott and Peng, 
2012). Given the difficulties of demand forecasting environments along with the problems of 
fluctuating prices of products in global markets, risk sharing contracts are increasingly 
expected to provide one form of trade-off solution for these demand and pricing uncertainties.  
 
2.2. Buyer-Supplier power and dependence 
 Supply chain strategies must examine the role and contribution of long term 
partnerships among buyers and suppliers (Kirytopoulos et al., 2010). Buyer-supplier power and 
interdependence is central to any contractual agreement (Cox, 2002). There is an emerging 
agenda in the SCM literature that is focusing on power and dependence from a SC stakeholder’s 
perspective (e.g. Caniels and Gelderman, 2007; Doran et al., 2005; Tomas et al., 2007; Sanders, 
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2008; Karabati and Sayin, 2008; Kheljani et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2012). Strategic partnering is 
an increasingly widespread approach for buyers and suppliers (Blancero and Ellram, 1997). 
Porter’s classic model (1985) supports the view that the buyers and suppliers will always try 
to gain as much advantage through their relationship. Kraljic’s Portfolio Purchasing Model 
(1983) classified a firm’s purchased intermediate products into four categories on the basis of 
the ‘profit impact’ (based on purchased quantity, percentage of total cost, impact on product 
quality and expected business growth) and supply risk (based on supplier availability, make-
or-buy options and mitigating possibilities). In recent times, many adaptations and refinements 
to Kraljic’s model have led to alternative portfolio models using other 
classifications/dimensions (Bensaou, 1999; Olsen and Ellram, 1997). However, there is a 
fundamental assumption underpinning all such portfolio models; the occurrence of differences 
in the power and dependency between a buyer and a supplier (Cox, 2002; Dubois and Pedersen, 
2002).  
 Whilst such supply portfolio models suggest several SC strategies for every product 
category, the conditions determining the choice for a specific buying strategy has remained a 
research issue (Gelderman and Van Weele, 2003). Successive researchers have adapted 
Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio model; for situational difficulty in purchasing (Olsen and Ellram, 
1997), balancing power (Kumar, 1996) and supply risk (Doran et al., 2005). Dani et al. (2005) 
studied buyer-supplier behaviour in power and dependence scenarios to predict what will 
promote the highest level of dependency. Therefore, there is abundant evidence in extant 
literature on how purchasing strategies can be used to characterize the relationship between the 
various quadrants of combined Kraljic and Cox model (see Fig. 1) and the power-dependence 
balance in buyer–supplier coordination (Van Weele, 2000; Saccani and Perona, 2007; Caniels 
and Gelderman, 2007). 
 
3. Conceptual Development 
 In order to meet the objective of developing a model capable of representing a contract 
for mitigating the risks associated with demand fluctuation and price uncertainty. In order to 
build on how the literature review identified the way that the interconnectedness of globalised 
economic activity magnifies risks, it was necessary to select a sample case organization with 
recurrent global exposure. A leading automotive manufacturer with component suppliers 
distributed around the globe was identified as fulfilling the research design requirements. As 
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the focal (hierarchical) firm in its automotive SC this organization also met the second 
objective of this research in terms of demonstrating and offering access to issues of power and 
dependency (a relational perspective on the dynamics of SC collaboration) stemming from its 
tiers of compliant suppliers. Thus the proposed analytical model for supply contract risk 
sharing includes a buyer-supplier relationship framework adapted from the literature and 
situational strength between stakeholders of the SC network (i.e. the focal firm and its globally 
distributed suppliers). 
 
 
Fig. 1 Buyer-Supplier relationship framework  
(Adapted from Kraljic, 1983 and Cox et al. 2002) 
   
 Cox et al. (2002) developed a framework for examining potential buyer supplier 
relationships based on relative utility of scarcity of resources. A buyer-supplier relationship is 
influenced by the importance of business relationships and the satisfaction of each party 
(Sinclair et al., 1996). Fig. 1 shows a buyer-supplier relationship framework adapted from 
Kraljic’s model combined with Cox’s model on buyer-supplier business relationship and 
satisfaction level. In the first quadrant, non-critical products demand efficient processing, 
product standardization, order variety and volume (Gelderman and Van Weele, 2003). They 
have relatively low financial value and purchasing risk. The buyer as well as supplier will 
independently satisfy their supply and demand requirements for such products. Due to the non-
critical nature of the products, the buyer does not have to depend on one particular supplier. 
Similarly, a supplier satisfies the orders by market hedging on available volume and variety for 
his product. Leverage products can be outsourced from multiple suppliers. These products 
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account for a large share of the end product’s cost price with a relatively low supply risk 
(Caniels and Gelderman, 2007). For leverage products, the buyer has the edge over the supplier 
due to the easy availability of the product. A buyer in this quadrant meets quantity requirements 
by exploiting wide-spread availability through for instance tendering, target pricing and 
product substitution. Leverage products have low value (low supply risk) and are ordered 
frequently under a situation of buyer dominance. For bottleneck products, suppliers have the 
dominant power position due to the product having relatively low financial impact, but high 
supply risk. A buyer usually tries to ensure a constant supply by maintaining high stocks rather 
than providing quantity flexibility to the supplier. Due to supplier dominance in this quadrant, 
the buyer manages its inventory exposure through safety stock and product differentiation 
strategies. For the buyer, strategic components suggest the need for enhanced collaboration 
with the supplier due to high product value and high supply risk. It seems this interest in a long 
term relationship is reciprocal, as whilst a buyer needs quantity flexibility the supplier expects 
order commitment for the product, hence, both seek a long term relationship through 
contractual agreements. Risk sharing contracts play an important role in this quadrant of 
satisfaction and dominance level. As this forth quadrant is driven by interdependence it meets 
the objective of offering a context where mutuality is a prime objective and hence risk sharing 
contracts are relevant. Hence in this study a boundary is placed (limited to forth quadrant) by 
restricting the scope of this research to conditions where mutual buyer supplier dependency 
inform contracting for a new risk sharing supply chain contract to mitigate demand and price 
flexibility. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Demand and price flexibility in supply chain: Contract perspective 
 
 The focal automotive manufacturing firm producing variety of truck models including 
Fork-lift trucks was selected to meet the study’s research design requirements. The firm 
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employed a Quantity Flexibility (QF) contract to mitigate high demand uncertainty, but were 
faced with high procurement costs due to global economic fluctuations. In the QF contract, the 
supplier charges the buyer a fixed unit wholesale cost with a limited flexibility for adjusting 
his initial order quantity without any penalty (Shi and Chen, 2008). The QF contract is a 
coordination tool that provides an opportunity to the buyer to revise its initial order or forecast 
and specifies upper and lower bounds (usually as percentages of the initial order) on the final 
order quantity (Karakaya and Bakal, 2013). Knoblich et al. (2015) focussed on the concept of 
quantity flexibility in the context of different customer forecast demand behaviour. In this 
study, this fundamental concept of a QF contract is utilised to develop the risk sharing contract 
by incorporating a high price uncertainty parameter to the problem. As seen in Fig. 2, buyback 
and/or revenue sharing contracts are suitable for low price uncertainty to accommodate demand 
volatility. This becomes complex when price volatility is high for strategic components; then 
the supplier and buyer have to negotiate for the wholesale cost based on the ordering quantity 
with an option to adjust the demand. Price volatility driven by political instability, global 
sourcing and government sanctions has been found to significantly impact both stakeholders 
in the SC (Davarzani et al., 2015). The risk sharing contract will mitigate supply chain risks 
related to the combined effect of demand uncertainty and price volatility. In a QF, buyback or 
revenue sharing contract, the partners share some of the inventory and stock-out burden 
(Arshinder et al., 2007); the buyer is expected to make a commitment to reserve the order 
quantity based on the forecasted demand. In return, the supplier provides the buyer the 
flexibility to vary the ordered quantity within certain agreed limits (Wang and Tsao, 2006). A 
risk sharing contract is different to the QF contract as it incorporates not just quantity flexibility 
but also includes a price flexibility option (to mitigate price volatility); by negotiating the costs 
for the committed quantity through contract negotiation.  
 A risk sharing contract incorporates the price flexibility factor in terms of wholesale 
and penalty costs for ordering under or over the committed quantity. In this type of contract, 
two scenarios are expected where the buyer may increase or decrease the order quantity after 
observing expected or realized demand fluctuations. If only upward adjustment is allowed, then 
the buyer will place a conservative initial order by trying to ‘transfer the risk’ to the supplier 
by forcing him to maintain high inventory. This opportunistic behaviour of the buyer 
unwittingly tends to increase price volatility. On the other hand, if only downward adjustment 
is allowed, the buyer will make a generous initial order or make an aggressive commitment 
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and try to ‘averse the risk’ of a demand shortage, leading to a bullwhip effect in the SC. 
Bidirectional adjustment contracts should be considered for supply chain performance (Wang 
and Tsao, 2006). Under the above two scenario’s, the risk sharing contract is expected to 
provide the leverage to both the stakeholders by providing the most accurate demand without 
much fluctuation in procurement costs. This negotiated coordination can provide appropriate 
incentives to the buyer as well as the supplier by sharing the risk of demand uncertainty and 
price volatility. 
  
4. Risk Sharing Contractual Model 
4.1. Model development 
 Consider a buyer facing varying procurement costs over a finite horizon for strategic 
components required in product assembly. The global supplier at the same time is facing 
demand uncertainty due to the typical nature of industries where demand is variable and 
unpredictable. The objective of the risk sharing contract in such a case would be to provide a 
stable procurement cost for the buyer and a committed order quantity for the supplier. This can 
only be achieved by identifying an appropriate contract quantity for the SC profit 
maximization. The contract model hence negotiates for a contractual ‘optimal quantity’ based 
on three distinct costs of the component namely quoted price, wholesale cost and penalty cost. 
The sensitivity of the model is dependent on two financial inputs, the wholesale cost for a 
minimum committed quantity and the penalty cost for not ordering the minimum committed 
quantity. Both these costs are based on the quoted price provided by the supplier. The model 
identifies the expected ordering quantity for the period by forecasting demand based on past 
orders. The negotiated contract costs i.e., wholesale cost and penalty cost are flexible and are 
determined based on the power and dependence relationship between buyer and supplier. Thus, 
the model is negotiated based on the quoted price provided by the supplier as a primary input 
parameter which later determines optimal quantity, wholesale cost and penalty cost for the 
contract. Demand predictability, physical efficiency and market responsiveness are important 
factors for supply chain management (Fisher, 1997). Assuming these conditions in a supply 
chain, the research examines decision making for the optimum contract quantity to balance risk 
between buyer and supplier. In the later part of this paper, we also study the implications of 
power and dependence on negotiated optimum quantity for the risk sharing contract. 
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4.2. Model formulation 
 The following assumptions are made before formulating the Integer Programming (IP) 
model for the risk sharing contract. 
• The ordering cost and holding cost are assumed to be constant during contract 
negotiation.  
• The contract quantity always lies between the minimum and maximum demand 
quantity anticipated by the buyer over the contract horizon. 
 Considering the above assumptions, the objective of the model is formulated to 
minimise the total purchase cost for the buyer and maximise the commitment quantity for the 
supplier. The decision variables used in the model are as follows: 
 Qi =   Forecasted demand quantity for ith period in the contract horizon 
 Qmin = Minimum expected demand in a contract horizon 
 Qmax = Maximum expected demand in contract horizon  
 Ce = Quoted price provided by the supplier 
 Cq = Negotiated wholesale cost for contract quantity 
 Cn = Negotiated penalty cost for under-ordered quantity 
 α = Ratio of negotiated wholesale cost to quoted price  
 β = Ratio of negotiated penalty cost to quoted price 
Q= Negotiated initial order quantity 
 The range for quantity variation is decided by the buyer and supplier based on Qmin  and 
Qmax predicted from the forecasted demand for the contract horizon. The flexibility option is 
utilised by the buyer by signing a contract for Q units with the flexibility to change the initial 
order Q to actual order of q units by a factor µ, such that (1 – µ) Q < q < (1+ µ) Q. The objective 
function for minimizing total purchase cost, Z for optimal commitment quantity Q* is 
formulated as IP model is given below: 
	𝑍 = {𝑥& 𝑄 ∗ 𝐶* + 𝑄& − 𝑄 ∗ 𝐶- 	+ 𝑦& 𝑄& ∗ 𝐶* + 𝑄 − 𝑄& ∗ 𝐶/ }12&31 																																(4.1) 𝑄9&/ ≤ 𝑄& ≤ 𝑄9;<																																																																																																																												(4.2) 𝐶* = 𝛼 ∗ 𝐶-																																																																																																																																									(4.3) 𝐶/ = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐶-																																																																																																																																										(4.4) 	𝛼 = 𝑓 𝑄 																																																																																																																																													(4.5) 	𝛽 = 𝑓 𝑄 																																																																																																																																												(4.6) 
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 𝑥& = 	 1, 𝑖𝑓	𝑄& > 𝑄0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 																																																																																																																			(4.7) 𝑦& = 	 1, 𝑖𝑓		𝑄& < 𝑄0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 																																																																																																																			(4.8) 𝑥& + 𝑦& = 1	; 		𝑥&, 𝑦& ∈ (0,1)																																																																																																														(4.9) 𝑄, 𝐶*, 𝐶/ ≥ 0																																																																																																																																					(4.10) 
 
 In the objective function (equation 4.1) we consider a yearly contract. There will be 
either over ordering or under ordering by the buyer with respect to the committed ‘contract 
quantity’ for every ith period (month). The first section in equation 4.1 considers the purchase 
cost for the over ordered quantity for ith period where the equation applies appropriate 
wholesale cost for contract quantity and a quoted price for units more than contract quantity. 
Similarly, the second part considers the under ordered purchase cost for ith period where the 
under ordered quantity is still purchased at wholesale cost with an additional penalty for the 
unordered quantity.  For every ith period, either of the two will be possible and binary function 
(equation 4.7, 4.8, 4.9) caters to this requirement along with other supporting constraints for 
non-negativity requirements (equation 4.10). Summation of purchase cost for i  periods 
provides the minimum total purchase cost for the contract horizon by solving IP problem for 
optimal contract quantity Q*. The contract horizon is considered to be a 12-month period for 
modelling purpose but can be varied on the basis of the nature and dependability of the industry. 
The above mathematical formulation provides an optimal solution for both the stakeholders 
through contract negotiation influenced by power and dependence. 
 
5. Analysis and Findings 
 The focal automotive manufacturing company producing Fork-lift trucks, with a global 
supply base selected for testing the developed model was aware of the problems they had faced 
during implementation of an earlier QF contract. Sourcing from global suppliers for vital 
components led to exposure to risks primarily associated with heavy price fluctuations and 
supply (as well as demand) uncertainty. Case company SC managers were approached to study 
their strategic outsourcing activity; data was then collected from primary sources of 
information like purchase orders, archival documents, internal presentations and other official 
purchase documents. After collecting relevant data, the analysis was conducted by testing the 
proposed contract model in two parts. Initially, forecasting techniques were used to predict the 
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expected demand quantity for future contract horizons and secondly, this forecasted data was 
utilized for identifying the optimal quantity for a risk sharing contract.   
 
5.1. Demand forecasting 
 Demand forecasting plays an important role in managing supply chains due to 
uncertainty in the demand (Gunasekaran and Ngai, 2009). Different forecasting methods are 
discussed in the literature to predict the demand quantity (Miyaoka and Kopczak, 2000; Chen, 
2000). The most commonly used approach for periodic forecasting is the Holt–Winters 
exponential smoothing approach. The demand for the next rolling horizon is forecast based on 
demand observed in the previous horizon. The Holt-Winters model used in this section of the 
study is based on three smoothing factors- level, trend and seasonality (Winters, 1960).  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Time Series demand forecasting for periods in contract horizon 
 
 Past 3-year demand data provided by the company was fed into the forecasting model.  
Fig. 3 shows the overlapping of actual demand data with the forecasted data in the central 
region of the graph. This is to check the validity of the forecasted data. Accuracy of the forecast 
is checked using ‘tracking signal’ value and it is found to be 0.147, which is comparatively 
very small and within the acceptable limits for an accurate forecast, since the maximum limit 
for acceptability of forecasted value is 4 (Jacobs et al., 2010). The forecasted vs. actual demand 
overlaps providing confidence in the anticipated demand quantity for the contract horizon. The 
forecasted demand data is now ready for being utilized in the contract model to find the 
optimum quantity in a contract horizon. 
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5.2. Solution and Comparison 
 The IP problem was formulated and solved in a widely used commercial optimization 
solver –LINGO as shown in Fig. 4. Two different dimensions were considered to capture the 
intricacies related to buyer-supplier power and dependence on the proposed risk sharing 
contract model. Two cases are typically observed during any contract negotiations and would 
provide us with insights into the associated situational strength. While negotiating the contract, 
buyer and supplier may consider the cost of the component to be independent of the contract 
quantity commitment. Hence in case 1, we analyse the model with an assumption that the buyer 
and supplier are negotiating the wholesale and penalty costs independent of the quantity 
commitment (α and β ≠ f Q). In case 2, the wholesale and penalty costs are negotiated based 
on the committed quantity ordered (α and β = f Q).     
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Snapshot: IP formulation in optimization solver  
 
Case 1: α and β independent of quantity ordered. {α and β ≠ f (Q)}  
 Here, wholesale cost and penalty cost are assumed to be independent of the quantity 
ordered and analysed for the results. Since the ordering quantity is calculated by varying α 
(0.75<= α <=1) and β (0<= β <=0.25) independently, 25 different combinations of α and β 
provide several optimal quantity solutions as seen in Fig. 5. It is observed that the lower 
wholesale cost (α) is expected to provide the supplier with highest committed contract 
(optimal) quantity. Similarly, when we compare the total purchase cost with respect to these  
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Fig. 5 Optimal Quantity for various combinations of α and β 
 
different combinations of α and β; it is observed that, the buyer can actually minimise total 
purchase cost by committing for a higher contract quantity as seen in Fig. 6.  In such a case, 
the buyer may over-order the quantity leading to a bullwhip effect, but this essentially shares 
the risk of the price volatility. On the other side, higher commitment of quantity shares the risk 
of demand fluctuation for the supplier. The overall effect of change in total purchase cost for 
lower values of α and for all values of β is significantly less and is beneficial for the buyer as 
well as the supplier. The quoted price paid for ordering more than the contract quantity is not 
influenced by the penalty cost paid for ordering less than the contract quantity, which is yet 
another significant finding. This also infers that the wholesale cost plays a major role in any 
contract negotiation, even if the penalty cost is associated in the contract. 
 The dividing line shown in Fig. 6 shows the dominating scenarios for two prominent 
stakeholders in purchasing commonly observed in forth quadrant (Fig. 1). This also provides 
buyer and supplier with their optimal contract zones for executing risk sharing supply chain 
contracts. The left half (in Fig. 6) is dominated by supplier power as it tries to bring down the 
wholesale cost to minimise their purchase cost, whereas the right half is dominated by buyer 
power trying to maximise their own profit by achieving a higher commitment quantity. This is 
a commonly observed phenomenon in SCM when demand is certain and independent of cost.   
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Fig. 6 Purchase cost versus α for varying β 
 
Case 2: When α and β are dependent on quantity ordered {α and β = f (Q)}. 
 In this case α and β are considered to be dependent on the committed quantity. This is 
a typical scenario where the negotiations are purely based on average order quantity (i.e. higher 
the average quantity order higher the wholesale price). The quantity ordered Q is evaluated by 
varying α (1>= α >=0.75) and β (0<= β <=0.25) values to suit best combinations for the optimal 
quantity. The model predicts local optimal solutions for different combinations of α and β. The 
local optimal solutions obtained for the case studied are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Local optimal solutions when α and β = f (Q) 
 
Wholesale price 
factor, α 
Penalty cost 
factor, β 
Purchase cost, Z Order Quantity, 
Q* 
0.91 0.112 128552.8 112 
0.87 0.07 123315.2 121 
0.85 0.05 119664.8 127 
0.8 0 111360.0 140 
 
 
 Table 1 show four different local optimal solutions obtained for the contract quantity. 
The values presented above are specific to the test model and could vary from contract to 
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contract. Nevertheless, the results give a transparent view of optimum quantity with total 
purchase cost for best combinations of α and β.  For a buyer this helps in understanding the 
best possible wholesale price and penalty cost combination within a specific demand range. 
Here the global optimum solution is not obtained as this can be achieved by paying the lowest 
possible wholesale cost without any penalty cost for the contract quantity. But, this is possible 
only in the third quadrant where the buyer is dominant during contract negotiations. The 
supplier would ask for the maximum commitment quantity at the quoted price, if the supplier 
were dominant in this quadrant. The impact of quantity ordered on negotiated costs is an 
important consideration for the contract negotiation as it provides both stakeholders with best 
combination of α and β, unlike two distinctive operability zones as in case I. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The research proposes a risk sharing contract to distribute the risk of demand 
uncertainty and price volatility among different SC stakeholders. The situational strength 
evaluated under buyer-supplier power and dependence following two cases illuminates the 
inherent complexity in contracting. The research develops a risk sharing contract in a SC 
environment ideal for studying strategic/vital components exposed to the combined risk of 
demand uncertainty and price volatility. The proposed contract provides directions for building 
long term supply chain contracts for mitigating known as well as unknown risks. The model 
would be suited to industries such as automobile, aerospace, electronics and computer 
manufacturing where product costs are high, components are sourced globally and there is 
highly uncertain demand due to increased completion. Although the scope of research was 
limited to the forth quadrant of the buyer-supplier relationship framework, the contract is 
believed to be beneficial for any satisfaction and dependence level in the matrix. The risk 
sharing contract model proposed here contributes to a potentially novel perspective on existing 
theory in buyer-supplier power and dependence by providing a relational perspective on the 
dynamics of supply chain design and collaboration. The developed relationship framework and 
risk sharing contract model are expected to help SC managers in better understanding 
behavioural aspects during contract negotiations. This study may also encourage the SCRM 
community to consider similar strategic contracts as a possible long term risk mitigation 
strategy. Increasing inter-dependence through the development of strategic alliances with SC 
partners is necessary due to the increased uncertainties and risks of a globalised business world. 
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A risk sharing contract is one such robust risk mitigation strategy for long-term profitability in 
SCM.  
 The SC contract model is validated through a single case company. Hence, further 
research is necessary to check the robustness of the model by testing it across different industry 
setting. Buyer-supplier relationships captured in the paper is limited and further research into 
the bounded rationality in SC risk sharing contracts is needed. The future supply chains are 
expected to be driven by the sustainability concerns (Wilhelm et al., 2016; Montabon et al., 
2016). The research should address the role risk sharing contracts can play specifically in 
meeting sustainability concerns, e.g. with social (co-ordination), economic (network 
profitability) and environmental (inventory obsolesce) parameters.  
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